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Kurt Vonnegut, in his book titled Slapstick, weaves a 
tale around shadowy characters who selectively increase the 
force of gravity and cause large groups of individuals to 
feel sluggish. After looking at a number of rural credit 
programs in low income countries (LICs) the past dozen 
years, I am tempted to conclude that some gremlins like 
Vonnegut?s mischievous characters are casting spells on 
these activities; most agricultural credit programs exhibit 
symptoms of excess "gs" pulling on their vital organs. In 
too few cases are these rural financial markets (RFMs) doing 
an adequate job of meeting equity and efficiency objectives, 
and far too many agricultural credit agencies are "black 
holes” into which large amounts of money, managerial time, 
and talent disappear.A/
These results are; especially disappointing given the
emphasis by governments and donor agencies on expanding the
quantity and quality of farm credit facilities the last
three decades; donor agencies have granted or lent in excess
* Comments and work by Warren Lee, Millard Long, Robert 
Vogel, Douglas Graham, Richard Meyer, Carlos Cuevas and 
Claudio Gonzalas-Vega are an important part of this essay.
1/ For more detail on these problems see Adams and others, 
editors; Von Pischke and others, editors; and Gordon Donald 
in the list of references.
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of 15 billion U.S. dollars over this period for agricultural 
credit. It is even more disappointing that most policy 
makers are resigned to mediocre results from rural credit 
programs.
Until recently, difficulties in each agricultural 
credit program were thought to be unique. Diversity in the 
agencies providing loans helped reinforce this impression. 
Problems were typically individualized and blame was assigned 
to diverse reasons such as incompetent managers and staffs, 
or to corrupt and inefficient governments. Management 
replacement, reorganizing and renaming credit agencies, 
nationalizing the lenders, shifting credit programs from 
troubled agencies to new organizations, and additional regu­
lations and controls have been traditional treatments for 
these problems. Despite these prescriptions, serious loan 
recovery problems persist, the reluctance of loan officers 
to lend to farmers and to the rural poor prevails, political 
considerations continue to influence agricultural lending 
procedures, and many of the lending agencies flounder 
because their costs of lending and defaults exceed revenues. 
It is clear that traditional treatments for ills in rural 
financial markets are not attacking the roots of problems.
The similarity of these difficulties across lenders and 
countries also lead me to think that a few common, not 
unique, causes may be responsible for chronic difficulties 
and that more uniform treatments might be considered.
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There are several reasons for the ineffective treat­
ments of RFM ills: First, a good deal of confusion exists
about the operations of these markets. The diffused nature 
of RFMs makes it difficult to understand easily their opera­
tions, and traditional assumptions and policies are widely 
applied but seldom tested. Far too many important policy 
decisions about RFMs are based on sterotypes, horror 
stories, and dogmas. Also, too many people think of a loan 
as a productive input, rather than as a general claim on any 
good or service in the market. In addition, too few people 
view financial intermediaries as independent decision makers 
who produce diverse financial services and that they can 
adjust easily to meet changing conditions. Policy makers 
have incorrectly viewed financial markets as a thin veil or 
as a set of irrigation channels whose headgates were manned 
by robots. Because rural financial intermediation is geo­
graphically dispersed and involves a very large number of 
participants, and because financial instruments are highly 
fungible and divisible, the feeling of control that many 
policy makers have over these markets is illusory.
Defective and incomplete problem diagnosis is a second 
reason for the persistent difficulties found in RFMs and is 
the main focus of this essay. Too much analysis of RFMs is 
similar to old medical prognoses that blamed ills on bad 
night air or on the patient having humors that were out of 
balance. Because of improper physical examinations, early
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shamans and physicians were unable to isolate the real 
causes of major illnesses. In some cases the treatments, 
such as the bleeding of patients, compounded the problem.
I am convinced that something similar is taking place in 
many RFMs• Treatments are applied without adequate examina­
tions of the patients and some "remedies" create ills more 
serious than the problems they are supposed to cure.
My principal objective in this paper is to outline 
diagnostic steps that might better allow investigators to 
identify the sources of problems plaguing RFMs. Because 
some of the causes are incorrect policies, I also discuss 
how the diagnostic process can be used to stimulate policy 
changes. I will conclude that a number of factors contri­
bute to the poor performance of RFMs, and that this forces 
"doctors of finance" to do extensive diagnoses. I will also 
argue that the supply side of financial services ought to 
receive much more diagnostic attention.
A Digression on the United States
There are substantial differences in the concerns of 
those who work on agricultural credit problems in the United 
States and those who worry about problems of rural finance 
in LICs. U.S. researchers have concentrated on the role of 
credit in farmers* management of risk and firm growth along 
with some work on lender performance (Brake and Melichar). 
Much of this U.S. research is aimed at helping farmers to
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manage their operations better and help lenders do a more 
adequate job of serving farmers. Those who work on problems 
in LICs have likewise wrestled with farm level credit-use 
questions , but have usually tried to estimate credit impact 
or credit demand (e.g., David and Meyer). In large part,
LIC research is directed at providing information for policy 
makers rather than for other RFM participants. In recent 
years, researchers on LIC problems have also looked at the 
overall performance of RFMs, how various policies affect 
this performance, and how financial markets participate in 
mobilizing voluntary savings. None of these three issues 
has received much attention in U.S. credit research.
These differences in research are strongly influenced 
by pressing RFM problems in most LICs, and the general lack 
of difficulties in these markets in the U.S. Several unique 
factors in the U.S. also influence agricultural credit 
research. These include a central bank that is quite inde­
pendent politically, secure land titles, a reasonably effi­
cient judicial system, and political stability. This is 
reinforced by a generally prosperous agricultural sector 
that allows many farmers to be creditworthy. Government 
investments in farming, price supports, and highly produc­
tive resources in agriculture contribute to this prosperity. 
In contrast, many LICs have price controls, overvalued 
exchange rates, and poor resources that make farming a low 
payoff activity.
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RFMs in the U.S. are also somewhat unique in the way 
they obtain funds for lending . Commercial banks rely 
heavily on rural deposits, while the cooperative credit 
system draws money from bond markets. Even with the Farmers 
Home Administration, the Commodity Credit Corporation and 
several other credit prog rams, the U.S. Government currently 
plays a limited role in the operations of U.S. RFMs. Most 
agricultural credit allocation decisions in the U.S. result 
from market forces and satisfactory performance is taken for 
granted. Few of these features are found in most LICs, and 
governments and donors typically feel that RFMs must be 
kicked and prodded before they will lend more to farmers. 
This, combined with emphasis on central planning, causes 
researchers in LICs to place much more stress on national 
policy issues than is true in the U.S.
Preliminaries to Diagnosis
Before doing RFM diagnosis it is useful to clarify four 
issues. The first is to understand what financial markets 
do. The second is to identify the relevant decision-making 
units involved in rural financial intermediation. The third 
is to recognize the strengths and weaknesses of RFM data. 
And, the fourth is to outline the steps that must be includ­
ed in a physical examination of a particular RFM.
What Financial Markets Do
Until recently, Keynesian economists and development
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economists gave relatively little attention to financial 
intermediation. Work by Goldsmith, Gurley, Shaw, and 
Patrick during the 1960s and early 1970s helped to clarify 
the support that finance gives to economic development. As 
Long has pointed out, finance makes four contributions to 
a commercial economy: it provides efficient means of
exchange, it encourages more efficient resource reallocation 
through transferring claims on resources from surplus to 
deficit units, it provides for the transformation and 
redistribution of risk among units, and finance can be used 
as an important tool in economic stabilization activities 
(in Von Pischke and others, editors).
The operations of financial markets can also strongly 
influence income and asset ownership distributions and can 
affect multipurpose organizations that provide rural finan­
cial services..?/ Many agricultural marketing and supply 
cooperatives have been weakened by their agricultural credit 
activities. Also, in many cases, there is a very close 
relationship between the political system and financial 
markets. In some cases financial markets, especially those 
in rural areas, may be important vehicles for allocating 
political patronage (see Kane, Ladman and Tinnermeier, and 
Robert for further details) Jl/
2/ SeveFaT^essays by Adams, Adams and Tommy, Gonzalez-Vega , 
and Vogel in Adams and others, editors, provide details 
on how financial markets affect income distributions,
3/ In Adams and others, editors, and in Von Pischke and 
others, editors.
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Decision-Making Units
By nature, f inancial markets involve many decision­
making units whose behavior must be understood for diag­
nostic purposes. These units include farm-household savers 
and borrowers, non-farm rural firms that borrow and save, 
formal and informal financial intermediaries, the central 
bank, the political system and/or the government, and the 
donor agencies. In addition to understanding the behavior 
of these units, the diagnosticians must also consider the 
collective behavior of all of these units and not be mes­
merized by the activities in only a single credit project or 
institution. For example, a donor funded project may stress 
making additional long-term loans to farmers and be success­
ful in doing so through one segment of the financial market. 
At the same time, other parts of the rural financial system 
may reduce the number of long-term loans by a greater 
amount. The net result of this would be a decrease in the 
amount of money available through RFMs for long-term loans.
A holistic approach is needed to document the performance of 
these markets.
Data Limitations
Financial markets are information gathering systems.
The information that moves through the formal system is 
usually loan (or deposit) specific. The formal lender 
gathers data to establish the creditworthiness of potential
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j ... keep track of loan repayment. Informationborrowers ana to Keep
. • i size, iustification given for theprocessed includes loan size, ju=»
1o.„, =o.e loan tenoo. -nO th. .ourc. o< tv*. »  ” **
the loan, m i l  man.aed «=ilt ^.noie. .1=0 » » e  i“ 'or-
mation on the repayment status of loans. In some cases this 
does not include readily available details on delinquent 
loans that have been refinanced or information on the length 
of time loans are overdue. In those cases where external 
donor agencies are involved, it is common for a good deal of 
information to be gathered for periodic project reports to 
donors on the progress made in disbursing and collecting 
•■the funds" provided by donors. In too few cases are these 
project reports of value to managers of the credit institu-
tion.
It is dangerous to draw firm conclusions about the 
characteristics of borrowers and savers from aggregate 
information published by most credit agencies or central 
banks. One has to be especially careful not to arrive at 
erroneous conclusions about the number of low income 
borrowers served by using the number of small loans made,
for example. People who are well-off may borrow small
-i __ multiple small-to-mediumamounts, and they may also have m u m p
loans, sometimes from several agencies. In extensive farm 
level research carried out by The Ohio State University in 
Brazil during the late 1960s and early 1970s, we found 
multiple loans to be very common. In one area, Sao Borja,
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the average farmer who borrowed had about 5 ,oa
aDout 5 loans outstand­
ing at the time of interview n
Wl 0ne farmer had 15 loans
(Adams and others)
One must also be careful in a>-=, •
. 1 ln drawi"3 inclusions about
the impact of loans based on the reason* ■easons given to justify
oans. In some cases a loan is diverted to othto other uses, in
manY other cases loan iustifiraf*. Justification and loan use may not be
closely associated with the c o n m r ™  t ' ue concurrent changes in liquidity 
use in the borrowing unit. For example, a farmer may
3 “ t l £ r  ■  l 0 "  • C O ., and „ y ,
l 0 * " '  b“'  * * " 1 - “  “  - K c i f i M  in  1 „ ,„  aoo„ .
raents. it is possible, however thn)- *nowever, that the farmer would have
purchased the cow, without- fK0 ir without the loan, with his or her own
unds. in this case, the net effect of the lerrect of the loan is not the
an additional cow, but rather the new activity 
u ndertaken by the borrower w ith „ i ,  o r „ «  „ „  I M <  ^
•U.0 by the been- Ciarityin, lh. strength, of
e data that are available and laying out additional infor­
mation that must be collected from primary sources is a 
major step in rfm diagnosis.
S^teps in Diagnosis
There ,r, ,t i , „ t flv. ,t.p, „ „  be ^
in the diagnosis of any m . TJ. pl,O M  ^  ^  ^
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policy concerns. Including local technicians, researchers, 
and policy makers in developing the work plan for a RFM sec­
tor assessment is a critical part of the process. The 
assessment itself should include historical information on 
(1) the structure and make up of the rural financial market, 
and (2) details on RFM public sector objectives and RFM per­
formance. (3) A careful inventory of the major policies 
that influence RFM activities is also a vital part of the 
diagnosis. This should include detailing how RFM policy 
decisions are made. Background information on the overall 
f inaneial market and monetary policies in the country must 
also be analyzed.
In those cases where (4) donor agencies and/or govern­
ments have directed a number of programs or projects through 
RFMs, these efforts should be detailed. Finally, it is 
important to (5) design the assessment so that policy makers 
are stimulated by the diagnostic process to make appropriate 
policy adjustments. Policy changes, not a final report, 
ought to be the end product of the RFM diagnosis. Major 
considerations in each of these steps are briefly outlined 
in the following discussion.
Market Structure
Most studies of RFMs collect a substantial amount of 
information on the make-up of the formal market (e.g. Graham 
and others). This includes an inventory of the agencies
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that provide loans for agricultural purposes and the amounts 
of agricultural loans provided. Most central banks collect 
this information from the commercial banks and major govern­
ment agricultural banks. It is sometimes necessary to 
supplement this information with additional data on loans 
made by cooperatives, credit unions, crop development agen­
cies, area development programs, agrarian reform agencies, 
and risk capital organizations. Where possible this infor­
mation should be gathered for the past decade and should 
include both year-end-balance (stock), and new loan (flow) 
figures in both nominal and real terms.
It is generally more difficult to get a clear idea 
about the make-up of informal rural financial markets.
Large, cross sectional studies aimed at documenting the 
extent and nature of informal markets are costly. It is 
also, common for these surveys to miss a good deal of lending 
that takes place among friends and relatives and to fail to 
pin down short-term loans that are mixed with the buying and 
selling of inputs and products. While it is useful to do 
limited surveys to establish a general idea about the rela­
tive importance of informal finance and to establish the 
range of arrangements made, it is more important to clarify 
the economics of informal lending, what kinds of marketing 
and other services do informal lenders provide to their 
clients? What are the costs of lending and the costs of 
borrowing in informal markets? What are the opportunity
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costs of the money lent by informal lenders? What is the 
degree of competition among informal lenders? What types of 
informal lending practices are useful for formal lenders to 
emulate? What is the relationship between formal and infor­
mal credit activities?
In addition to collecting information on the volume of 
loans made by formal and informal lenders, information should 
also be collected on the various types of deposits handled 
by RFMs.
Objectives and Performance
In large part, the usefulness of a RFM is measured by 
the degree to which its activities help meet public policy 
objectives. It is important to recognize that firms and 
individuals providing financial services in rural areas are 
usually involved in multiple activities and thus produce 
several products and services. Under these circumstances, 
it should not be surprising that these firms and individuals 
can change the types and amounts of financial services 
offered relatively easily, if they find it in their interest 
to do so.
The specific objectives that a govemnment attempts to 
achieve through rural financial markets varies across 
countries and through time within countries. At least four 
common objectives are pursued through most RFMs. These are: 
(1) that financial markets should help the poor; (2) that
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the operations of financial markets should result in more 
agricultural output through efficient allocation of 
resources; (3) that RFM activities should boost government 
efforts in other productive sectors? and, (4) that financial 
intermediaries should evolve into strong and self sufficient 
institutions.
Two groups of performance measures should be employed 
in the diagnosis. The first focuses on the performance of 
the entire RFM, while the other sheds light on the perfor­
mance of individual intermediaries or credit programs. 
Historically, evaluations of RFM activities have stressed 
the latter at the expense of the former, but both types of 
information are necessary to establish cause and effect in 
financial activities. The specific performance measures 
used must be those that show the extent to which financial 
markets are helping to achieve public goals. For example, 
if an objective is to provide more financial services to the 
rural poor, performance measures must clarify the charac­
teristics of those who borrow and save in financial markets 
and the extent of their benefits. Also, if an objective is 
to expand the amount of agricultural lending, performance 
indicators must measure the real as well as nominal amounts 
lent for agricultural purposes and also show what is hap­
pening to this type of lending compared to loans in other 
economic sectors.
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Because of the data problems mentioned earlier, it is 
not generally clear who is receiving the major benefits from 
RFM operations. Clearly, those who receive no loans and 
hold no financial deposits do not directly benefit from 
these services. It is also clear that those who are able to 
obtain large loans at concessionary interest rates or who 
default on large loans benefit substantially from borrowing. 
A large part of what a financial market does is masked by 
the large number of small to medium sized loans and deposits 
involved. It takes a good deal of digging to clarify the 
economic characteristics of those who use these services and 
to measure the benefits they receive.
The benefits from use of loans fall into three cate­
gories: normal gains from use of leverage, income transfers
that result from below equilibrium real rates of interest on 
loans, and the benefits that go to those who default on 
their loans and take the money as a once-and-for-all 
transfer. The amount of benefit realized from loan leverage 
is very difficult to document across a large number of 
borrowers. It, like the other two types of benefits, never­
theless, is proportional to the amount of money borrowed*
The more money borrowed the greater the gain. Because of 
the possibilities of one borrower holding multiple loans, 
loan size distribution information will give only a lower 
bound estimate of loan concentration. Some borrower inter­
viewing must be done to document the extent of multiple
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loans and to clarify who is defaulting on loans. Some 
aggregate measures of the amount of income transferred to 
borrowers through default and below equilibrium rates of 
interest, along with the "tax" placed on financial savers 
through below equilibrium rates'of interest, can be useful 
performance measures.
It is impossible to measure directly the extent to 
which RFMs are helping to allocate resources more efficiently 
because these economic gains occur in widely dispersed bits 
and pieces. Several indirect measures, however, can be used 
to give a general idea of efficiency performance. The first 
measure shows how well financial activities are integrated 
in rural areas. This is best measured by the borrowing 
costs from various sources in RFM. If there are substantial 
variations in borrowing costs for similar quality loan ser­
vices, this indicates that RFMs are fragmented and that 
loans are being rationed among borrowers, some are being 
excluded, and loses in efficiency are taking place.
Detailed information on the total costs of financial 
intermediation, including both borrower and lender portions 
of these costs, shed a good deal of light on fragmentation 
questions. How lenders absorb or allocate their loan tran­
saction costs can also show the extent to which these tran­
saction costs are used by the lender to ration credit under 
interest rate controls. Information on the types of innova­
tions adopted by financial intermediaries can also help to
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clarify these issues* How does an innovation affect the 
lender's costs, the borrower's costs, and the quality of the 
service provided by the lender? Is the innovator larg ely 
motivated by desires to reduce the costs of financial inter­
mediation, or is it largely an attempt by the intermediary 
to evade the intent of regulations? Does the innovation 
reduce the total costs of financial intermediation shared by 
the borrower and the lender? Also, is the proportion of the 
total costs of financial intermediation incurred by the 
lender a sensitive measure of the degree of credit rationing 
through reallocation of loan transaction costs to the 
borrowers, and thus a proxy for the degree of fragmentation 
found in RFMs?
A number of direct measures can be used to indicate the 
degree to which RFMs respond to government priorities in 
terms of farm enterprises, term structures of loans and 
lending to priority sectors. Several measures can also be 
used to indicate the overall growth of the rural financial 
system. Several credit-to-output ratios, for example, can 
be used to show changes in the relative amounts of agri­
cultural credit over time. Credit-to-credit ratios can be 
used to show changes in relative amounts lent to various 
sectors of the economy. Details on the term structure of 
loans made by the formal RFM can also indicate the extent to 
which intermediaries are helping to reinforce government
priorities in medium-and long-term investments. Some inter­
viewing with bank employees may be necessary to see how many 
loan justifications are simply redefined to meet policy 
objectives.
If a major government object is to control the growth 
of the money supply, the degree to which rural financial 
markets are self-financing would be an important performance 
measure. in addition, information on net flows of funds 
into or out of rural areas through financial markets can 
also indicate the extent to which financial markets help 
achieve social objectives.
A small number of measures can be used to indicate the 
vitality of the financial intermediaries handling credit and 
deposit activities in rural areas. These measures include 
1oan collection records, the ex tent to which they are able 
to maintain and expand the real amount of funds they lend, 
institutional renaming and reorganization, the extent of 
political interference, manager turnover, and the extent to 
which the system is self-financing and able to cover its own 
costs of operation.
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Policies Affecting RFMs
RFMs are strongly affected by three sets of policies: 
(1) those directed at influencing the money supply, the 
overall monetary system, and financial activities in 
general? (2) those directed at rural financial markets; and
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(3) those policies that affect the rates of return that pro­
ducers in rural areas expect from their investments. It is 
especially useful to understand how these policies are made.
Gathering information on the first two types of poli­
cies is usually straight forward. Decrees by the monetary 
authority,, the ministry of finance, or the central bank 
generally document the intent of these policies. These 
policies include changing the ownership of banks from pri­
vate to government owned, various loan portfolio quotas, 
discount mechanisms, reserve requirements, interest rate 
controls, loan insurance schemes, building new inter­
mediaries, and various reporting and accounting require­
ments. Some original work must generally be done on how 
financial intermediaries interpret and react to these poli­
cies, however.
Clarifying the extent to which various economic poli­
cies affect the returns to investments in rural areas is 
more difficult. These policies include those that influence 
the prices paid to rural producers, those policies that 
affect the prices rural producers pay for purchased inputs, 
and those policies that affect farm yields. Information on 
these rates of return are critical in RFM physical examina­
tions because of several important and too often neglected 
issues; rates of return affect income and thus repayment 
capacities, and expected income also strongly influences the 
amount individuals are willing to borrow, with obvious
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implications for economies of scale in financial operations. 
In addition, rates of return affect incomes, which in turn, 
also strongly influence the amounts of money rural indivi­
duals have to deposit in financial institutions.
In many low income countries relatively few farm and 
non-farm businesses in rural areas expect to receive high 
and stable returns from their investments. In some cases 
this is due to unproductive resources and to harsh climates. 
In all too many cases, however, these low returns are due to 
policies that depress farm product prices, policies that 
raise the prices of purchased inputs, and lack of public 
investment in public goods like irrigation facilities and 
agricultural research that could increase yields. It is 
impossible to develop a healthy and expanding financial 
system if most rural producers serviced are not healthy eco­
nomically.
Because of the heterogeneity that exists among produ­
cers in rural areas it is quite difficult to measure directly 
the rates of return that might be expected from the numerous 
activities carried out in rural areas. Normal proxies for 
these rates of return, loan demand and repayment rates, are 
often useless because of concessionary rates of interest on 
formal loans and the intrusions of politics into loan 
repayment. Even with harsh price controls on agricultural 
products and low yield, there will always be a few rural 
producers who can realize relatively high returns on their
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investment alternatives. A few of these producers can make 
profitable use of loan services, pay market rates of interest 
on their loans, and have an excellent chance of repaying 
their loans. In some cases governments may give certain 
segments of the agricultural sector special treatment that 
results in relatively high returns to producers in that sec­
tor, while many other parts of the agricultural system have 
poor investment possibilities.
In most cases unfavorable price policies in the agri­
cultural sector and the lack of government investment 
therein stem from economy-wide policy considerations. Cheap 
and abundant credit is often used by policy makers to offset 
the adverse effects on income distribution and resource 
allocation of these broader repressive policy measures. As 
discussed elsewhere, cheap credit fails on both efficiency 
and equity grounds (Adams and others, editors). Low interest 
rates force lenders to concentrate cheap loans in the hands 
of relatively few people, and low interest rates do not make 
unprofitable investments profitable.
A number of measures can provide general answers to 
rates-of-return questions. If a few major products like 
sugar cane or rice are important in the rural economy, pro­
duction functions or budgeting studies of representative 
farms can give insights into potential returns from addi­
tional liquidity provided by loans. Other more general 
proxies like terms-of-trade series between the agricultural
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and non-agricultural sectors, historical yield information, 
and price information on products and inputs are also useful 
to shed light on farm profitability* The rates of return 
realized by informal lenders in rural areas might also be 
used to indicate the returns that at least some borrowers 
realize from borrowed liquidity.
Donor Involvement
Xn some LICs donors have provided a very large part of 
the total funds lent through agricultural credit programs.
In some cases donors have also helped set up agencies that 
are important parts of the formal credit system, in other 
cases donors may have been involved in the development or 
funding of only a portion of the rural financial market. in 
a few of the LICs donor assistance has been only a smal1 
part of the overall build up in thb agricultural credit 
system• Where the World Bank, the regional development 
banks, or bilateral aid agencies are significantly involved, 
it is necessary to understand that involvement as part of 
the physical examination of RFMs.
It is typical for donor agencies to divide territory in 
LICs into areas of interest. Understandably, donors like to 
establish long-term working relationships with agencies and 
fund a series of projects through these agencies. A repre­
sentative country arrangement would be for the World Bank to
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move its funds into a central bank or lead bank for 
rediscounting to other elements of the banking system for 
agricultural loans, for a bilateral aid agency like the 
Agency for International Development to provide funds for a 
supervised credit program for farmers, and for one of the 
regional development banks, like the Inter-American Devel­
opment Bank to provide a number of loans and technical 
assistance to an agricultural bank. In some cases the beha­
vior of a financial intermediary is strongly shaped and 
influenced by its financial patron. In a few cases aid 
technicians may have a very strong influence on the opera­
tion of the intermediary. In virtually all cases the donor- 
supported credit program will be heavily flavored by the 
orthodoxy that prevails in the donor agency.
It is also necessary to establish the degree to which 
donor agencies are involved in setting policies in rural 
financial markets. One should also look at the extent to 
which donor involvement reorients the financial system away 
from traditional sources of liquidity for loan funds and 
also warps their information gathering. At the same time, 
evaluations and loan documents that are associated with 
donor assistance can often provide valuable information
about RFMs activities.
24
Involving Policy Makers
Many of the problems found in RFMs are the result of 
incorrect policies. Improving the performance of these 
markets, as a result, is mainly a problem of getting 
appropriate policies adopted. A well done,’ written diagno­
sis of RFMs is far from sufficient, in most cases, to get 
some of these very controversial, yet critical policies 
changed. it generally takes a good deal of convincing of a 
relatively large number of policy makers, technicians, and 
politicians before these policy adjustments are seriously 
considered. A very important part of the RFM physical exa­
mination is getting key decision makers in the LIC involved 
in the diagnostic process. This includes representatives of 
the involved donor agencies.
Because the main result of the diagnosis must be policy 
change and not just a written report, disseminating the results 
of the diagnosis should be a vital part of the process.
Local researchers, local technicians and mid-level policy 
makers must feel involved in the diagnostic process and 
agree with the conclusion reached. Periodic workshops, 
seminars and conferences with policy makers during the 
diagnosis, to keep them up-to-date and involved, are very 
important. In Some cases the analysis must be adjusted 
along the way to meet special concerns that surface among 
policy makers.
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It is also useful to strengthen the capacity of local 
people to do analytic work on RFMs as part of the diagnosis. 
Ideally, this should include helping to develop a small 
research group in one of the local institutions, 1ike the 
central bank, that can continue to do evaluations of the RFM 
after the initial examination of the RFM is completed.
Concluding Observations
I am increasingly convinced that most of the needed 
knowledge is at hand to allow "finance doctors" to improve 
substantially the performance of rural financial markets in 
many of the low income countries and that it is possible to 
make quantum jumps in the performance of these markets simi­
lar to those made in production of rice and wheat through 
adoption of the miracle varieties of the mid-1960s. But to 
do this it will be necessary to improve substantially the 
physical examinations that are given to rural financial 
markets and to do a much more systematic job of using these 
analyses to influence policy makers to adopt more appropriate 
treatments. Because of the very diffused nature of finan­
cial markets, especially in rural areas, it is easy to be 
overwhelmed by data requirements and complexities in doing a 
diagnosis of these markets. It is very important that the 
right kind of questions be asked, that only judicious 
amounts of data are collected to answer these questions, and
26
that systematic and comprehensive procedures be used in the 
physical examination.
In the past three decades a large part of the analysis 
done on problems of agricultural credit and rural savings 
has focused on the demand for credit, rural savings capaci­
ties, and farmer behavior. The diagnostic steps I suggest 
in this essay place much more emphasis on the supply of 
f inaneial services, on the behavior of financial inter— 
mediaries, and on helping policy makers to identify better 
treatments than subsidized credit for the ills that bedevil 
rural financial markets in so many of the low income 
countries. I firmly believe that improved physical examina­
tions of rural financial markets will reveal that policy 
makers, not some unseen gremlins, are inadvertently the ones 
who are turning up the forces of gravity under many agri­
cultural- credit programs in low income countries.
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